The BOUNDLESSINFORMANT screenshot for the Netherlands (picture by NRC Handelsblad - click to enlarge

(Updated: February 11, 2014) Today, the Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad doing business in brazil finally published the complete BOUNDLESSINFORMANT screenshot that shows data related to the Netherlands. This came after a surprising revelation by the Dutch government that the 1,8 million metadata shown in that screenshot were not from Dutch citizens and intercepted by NSA, but actually from a legitimate collection against foreign targets by the Dutch military intelligence agency MIVD which was passed on to the Americans. Here, I will analyse the chart and compare it with similar charts about various other countries that were published earlier. More about the background, which caused some severe political problems for the Dutch interior minister, will be added soon!
The BOUNDLESSINFORMANT screenshot for the Netherlands (picture by NRC Handelsblad - click to enlarge) The first thing that catches the eye is that the screenshot is shown here on paper, together with another sheet with an orange bar bearing a classification marking and a cardboard folder. The sheets look like as if they became wet and also show some white paint brush-like stains (all previous screenshots were published as digital files). Probably these effects were photoshopped by the paper to make it look extra special. For example, the classification marking on the second sheet seems fake, as it reads: TOPSECRET//S//NOFORN, where in reality Top Secret are two separate words and the compartment for this kind of information is not S, but SI for Special Intelligence. doing business in brazil That said, we now take a look at the information in the screenshot itself. In the upper part there's the bar chart which was already doing business in brazil published back in August 2013 by Der Spiegel . The green bars show that only DNR (Dialed Number Recognition, which is telephony) metadata were collected. In the lower part, which was published for the first time today, there are three sections with some details about this collection: Signal Profile This section has a pie chart which can show various doing business in brazil types of communication. In this case, all metadata were collected from PSTN , which stands for Public Switched Telephone Network . This is the traditional telephone infrastructure, consisting of telephone lines, (undersea) fiber optic cables, microwave transmission links, cellular networks, and communications satellites, all interconnected by switching centers. In this case, MIVD collected the metadata using their satellite station near Burum, which is operated by the signals intelligence unit NSO . This station is conveniently situated next to a big commercial ground station operated by Stratos Global , which provides access to Inmarsat , and Castor , providing access to Intelsat , Eutelsat, Gazprom, RSCC, SES (Astra), Telesat, and Arabsat satellites. Whereas nowadays almost all intercontinental communications pass undersea fiber optic cables, some less-developed countries like Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, Cuba and North-Korea, and remote regions in Russia, China and Africa apparently still use Intelsat satellite links for their international telecommunications. A number of these countries are also linked to Intersputnik satellites. An example given by the NRC newspaper is that of calls made by Somali people from call shops in a Dutch city like Rotterdam doing business in brazil to the Somali capital Mogadishu. If these calls travel through satellite links, the MIVD is able to collect their metadata. The agency only gathers communications that are related to terrorism and those that are necessary to support international military operations.
The Burum teleport, with the NSO intercept station (left) and the ground station operated by Stratos Global and Castor (right) (photo: Castor - click to enlarge) In the case of the 1,8 million, doing business in brazil MIVD collected metadata from phonecalls and from some sms and fax messages that "originated and/or terminated" in foreign countries and filtered out all communication data with a Dutch phone number. doing business in brazil According to a reply from the government, doing business in brazil the remaining data were then "shared with partner agencies". This means, these data weren't just shared with NSA on a bilateral basis, but also in multinational military intelligence sharing doing business in brazil groups like the 9-Eyes and the 14-Eyes, which is actually called SIGINT Seniors Europe . Both groups consist of the Five Eyes plus a number of 3rd Party nations. Most Volume In the screenshot we can see that the metadata records were collected through a facility doing business in brazil designated by the SIGAD US-985Y . According to NRC, Dutch government sources say that this SIGAD does not designate a single facility, but rather "metadata collected by MIVD that are shared with NSA". This means that these data could be derived from multiple collection platforms and not just from the satellite intercept station near Burum, although the Dutch government said that in this case the 1,8 million metadata were collected through satellite interception. Besides Burum, the Dutch SIGINT doing business in brazil unit NSO also has a high-frequency doing business in brazil radio